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Rational Agents, Contract Curves, 
and Inefficient Compromises 
Gregory E. Kersten and Sunil J. Noronha, Member, IEEE 
Abstract-Several studies of two-party negotiations have shown 
that negotiators more often than not reach inefficient compro-
mises. We analyze the circumstances under which rational agents 
make inefficient compromises and refrain Crom improving them. 
We do this by describing and interpreting various negotiation 
situations and by developing formal constructs and theorems 
for determining the character of a negotiation situation. Key 
among these concepts is the notion or opposition. Although 
opposition is defined in terms oC utility functions, it is more 
fundamental in the sense that it is more intuitive to decision 
makers and can be used in contexts in which the parties' utilities 
are unknown or are partially known. The effects of various 
rationality assumptions on efficiency and their implications for 
negotiation support systems are discussed. We argue that the 
prescriptive/descriptive approach advocated by negotiation ana-
lysts lacks sufficient explanatory powers to be effectively used in 
negotiation support and that negotiation support systems should 
not constrain the parties to the set of efficient points. 
llldex Terms- Bargaining, conflict analysis, decision and ne-
gotiation support, efficiency, negotiation analysis, negotiations, 
opposition, rationality, utility. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A LEMI, Fos, and Lacorte [l] conducted experiments with six professionals, some of whom were professional ne-
gotiators or were often involved in negotiations. These ex-
periments showed that the negotiators more often than not 
reached inefficient compromises. In [ l ], the authors state that 
"If physicians and managers can arrive at Pareto-optimal 
contracts, then their negotiations are effective." Similar results 
have been reported in [2] with only 10% of 90 dyads achieving 
an efficient compromise [3]-[5]. 
Teich et al. [6] conducted experiments with students us-
ing two negotiation support systems. They also often did 
not achieve an efficient (i .e., Pareto-optimal) compromise. 
Moreover, when the students were presented with an efficient 
compromise they did not want to move from the inefficient to 
the efficient compromise. 
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In a discussion on rational choice in games McClennen [7, 
p. 259), says the following: 
"When one turns to consider nonstrictly competitive 
games, the assumption that rational players are bound 
by the principle of maximization of expected utility 
proves to be quite paradoxical. Except under very special 
circumstances, it ensures that rational interaction will fail 
to satisfy the criterion of Pareto optimality." 
This appears to be an unusual remark and one that has 
no support in the literature on prescriptive decision making, 
rational agents and the application of decision analysis to 
negotiations [5), [8). On the other hand, this remark, as 
indicated above, is substantiated by real-life negotiation and 
by laboratory experiments. In this paper, we analyze the 
circumstances under which rational agents do not choose 
efficient compromise proposals and achieve an inefficient 
compromise. We also make the argument that rational agents 
who have achieved an inefficient compromise may not want 
to change it and accept an efficient one, and present reasons 
for such behavior. We take a cognitive perspective and present 
formulae to model the reasons underlying the agents' behavior. 
The discussion is illustrated with a simple case of two-issue 
bilateral negotiations. 
The objectives of this paper are two-fold. One is to de-
scribe and interpret different negotiation situations and study 
situations in which rational agents fail to achieve efficient 
compromises. The other is to argue that the asymmetrically 
prescriptive/descriptive approach advocated by negotiation an-
alysts [5) , [8). [9) lacks sufficient explanatory power and 
a consistent analytic framework to be effectively used in 
negotiation support. Negotiation analysis does not take into 
account the rationalities underlying the opponent's behavior, 
nor does it allow for multiple or divergent rationalities, which 
are typical of human decision making [10)-[13). We outline 
how models of the opponent's behavior can be constructed 
from partial information. 
We take a prescriptive/normative perspective. The norma-
tive perspective is in the assumptions of both parties being 
rational, using logically consistent decision procedures, and 
wanting to achieve an efficient compromise. The supported 
party is being offered prescriptions on how to make better 
decision leading to an efficient compromise. There are several 
significant distinctions to the traditional normative approaches, 
prime among which is that we do not posit a single game-
theoretic rationality with a known utility function . 
Negotiation analysts using the traditional approach live with 
the inconsistency of using a model which assumes complete 
I083-4427/98SIO.OO © 1998 IEEE 
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knowledge of the decision maker and the problem and there-
fore presumes to give complete advice, but of having in reality 
to make considerable practical modifications and adaptations 
since the problem is never complete. This lack of completeness 
encompasses not only the opponent but also the supported 
decision maker. Therefore, Lax and Sebenius (8), (14) amend 
formal representations with numerous prescriptions that are 
more in line with the rules and principles proposed by Fisher, 
Ury and their associates [ 15), [ 16) than with the prescriptions 
of negotiation analysis (5). Review of the applications and 
negotiation support systems that are based on negotiation 
analysis suggests its two main uses: education and research 
(8), (17), [18). 
Our view is that attempts to measure all relevant aspects 
of the problem are often fruitless, any prescription is only 
partial and tentative, and that negotiation analysis and support 
should not constrain the agents to the set of efficient offers. 
We advocate the use of methods that permit formal analysis of 
whatever qualitative information is available. In particular, the 
approach based on the concept of opposition that we propose 
has the advantage of supporting analysis without requiring 
precise elicitation of the parties ' utility curves over the entire 
space of feasible compromises. Moreover, it allows one to use 
many attributes of the problem, process, and decision makers 
that the parties are unable to incorporate into their respective 
utilities. Indeed, the concept of opposition or motivational 
force can be viewed as more fundamental in the sense that 
it exists for problems for which utility functions cannot exist. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present 
a negotiation case to introduce the concepts and issues con-
sidered later. The assumptions and definitions of the nature 
of opposition are formulated in Section III . Formal conditions 
for efficient compromises are obtained in Section IV. It has 
been observed (see, e.g., [ 19)), that even small changes in the 
parties' preferences may change their relationship from strong 
to weak opposition, and these cases are explored in Section IV. 
We show, further, that the opposition may also change when 
the parties consider different alternatives while maintaining 
their preferences. Behavioral reasons that may cause the nego-
tiating agents to resist accepting an efficient compromise in the 
situation when an inefficient one was negotiated are given in 
Section V. Acceptance of inefficient compromises by rational 
agents has significant implications for negotiation analysis 
and support and some of these implications are presented in 
Section VI, which concludes the paper. 
II. Two-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS 
A. Trade Union Case-In itial Positions 
Consider a simple case of negotiation between trade union 
and management over only two issues. 1 The first issue is 
salary. The second issue involves a bonus which is tied 
to the production level; the bonus is being paid only after 
some number of widgets has been produced. The number of 
1 The case presented here is highly stylized. However. from our discussions 
with a trade union negotiator, the manner-though not the language-in 
which the issues are discussed and the reasoning process correspond 10 those 
experienced in real negotiations. 
TABLE I 
INmAL PosmoNs 
Union (UO) Management (MO) 
Salarv level s 7,000 s 3,400 
No. of widgets 1.200 5.100 
TABLE II 
FJVE EQUIVALENT ALTERNATIVES 
Alternatives cl e2 e3 e4 e5 
Salary level $ 5,100 s 5,200 s 5,600 $ 6.100 s 6,600 
No. of widgets 1,200 1.800 2,700 3.500 4,200 
widgets and the salary level are the subject of negotiation. Not 
surprisingly, the union wants the highest possible salary level 
and the lowest number of widgets. The management' s interests 
are opposing. The two sides may have different preferences 
with respect to each issue, but each party does not know the 
preferences of the other party, except qualitatively. Moreover, 
we assume that there are no other issues known or unknown 
to the party. 
The union announced its opening position and the manage-
ment replied to it. The two offers are presented in Table I. 
B. Concessions and Utility Equivalent Alternatives 
The union decides to make a concession and propose a 
new offer of ($5600; 2700). However, a decision analyst is 
among its membership and he persuades the negotiating team 
to use his services. The analyst determines, through a series 
of pairwise comparisons,2 that the union's negotiating team is 
indifferent among five alternatives including the contemplated 
alternative ($5600; 2700). The five equivalent alternatives are 
given in Table II. 
To get an analytical handle on the problem, the analyst 
attempts to fit a curve to the el-c5 point estimates. He chooses 
a hyperbola, guided both visually by the relative positions of 
the points and by the asymptotic properties of the curve, and is 
able to obtain a meaningful interpretation of the components 
of the resultant expression, as described below. The analyst 
obtains the union's utility function as 
( 
3.902 ) Uu(w, s) = 15 + 0.5 s + w _ 5.596 (1) 
where s is the salary in thousands of dollars, and w the number 
of widgets in thousands. The constant 15 and the multiplication 
factor of 0.5 have no real significance as is usual for utility 
functions, since utilities are determined unambiguously only 
2 While we do not wish to underplay the difficulty of eliciting preference 
information such as this, extending our example to model uncertainties and 
discussing the traditional lottery/fair-bet/revealed preference issues that beset 
utility theory would considerably lengthen this paper and would be incidental 
to its purpose_.,lucidaling the propenies of opposition and its implications 
with respect to rationality and inefficiency in even the simplest deterministic 
case. 
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up to a translation and a scaling (20] , and have been simply 
chosen so as to make the three-dimensional (3-D) plot in Fig. I 
easy to view. (For this particular choice of translation and 
scal ing (15 and 0.5, respectively), the fitted curve corresponds 
to Uu( w, s) ~ 17.1.) The expression reflects the union's desire 
for a higher salary, as well as a desire to make as few widgets 
as possible. The term ( w - 5.59) in the denominator reflects 
the fact that it is impossible to increase the number of widgets 
that can be humanly made beyond a point (about 5000), and 
causes the utility to fall sharply (or all the level curves to rise 
steeply near that point). 
The union negotiating team appreciates the analyst's work 
and decides to make an offer c2 = (1800; S5200) instead 
of c3 = (2700; S5600) which was earlier contemplated. The 
analyst, to the surprise of the union team, strongly argues 
against this offer. He says that selection of this offer may 
result in a "nonoptimal" (or, strictly speaking, inefficient) 
compromise. The analyst who during the earlier session with 
the team had determined the team's utility now wants to 
present an argument for selecting c4 = (3500; $6100). He 
begins the presentation with Fig. 2. 
The analyst does not know the management's utility func-
tion and, therefore, he cannot precisely determine the efficient 
solutions. However, he knows that the management is inter-
ested in both low salary level and high number of widgets 
before the bonus is paid. Thus, the management's tradeoffs 
or indifference curves must have a positive slope (i .e., the 
tangents at various points along the curve must form an acute 
angle with the horizontal w axis). 
Although the analyst does not know the precise tradeoffs, he 
can hypothesize the extreme values of the tradeoffs, and make 
conservative estimates of a range of slopes that management' s 
indifference curves must lie within, at any point in the feasible 
set. Fig. 3 illustrates the various possibilities, including the 
Salary (s) 
2 3 4 5 Widgets(.._, 
Fig. 2. Mapping of union's utility in offer space. 
Salary (s) 
2 3 4 5 Widgets(.._, 
Fig. 3. The range of management ' s possible indifference curves at e3. 
mapping of two extremal utility functions u;tt(s, w) and 
UM (s, w) that he considers at c3. 
Function U;tt(s , w) corresponds to the assumption that the 
management is predominantly interested in widget production 
and much less in the salary level; while UM ( s, w) reflects the 
assumption that the management's preference for low salary is 
much stronger than widgets production. The analyst does not 
know the form of either of these functions, but merely knows 
that their gradients (slopes, representing tradeoffs or relative 
weighting between salary and widgets) must almost cenainly 
be within extreme values (0.3, 3] as illustrated. Knowing just 
this, and the theorem given in Section IV, he can determine 
the region within which the contract curve (CC) must lie. We 
call this the region of possibly efficient compromises and it 
is the shaded area E in Fig. 3. Its computation is described 
in Appendix A. It is the analyst's contention that since the 
estimates were conservative, the solutions just within the 
boundary of E (e.g., c6), while possibly efficient, are less 
probably efficient than solutions in the interior of E, as the 
fonner reflect extreme values of management's preferences. 
The analyst presents Fig. 3 to the negotiating team and 
shows that c2 does not lie on any possible CC. It means, 
he explains, that c2 is an inefficient compromise for any 
possible utility function of the management. The closest and 
extremal possibly-efficient point which is utility-equivalent to 
cl, c2, · · ·, c5 is c6. He, therefore, is convinced that selec-
tion of c2 may "push" the negotiation toward an inefficient 
compromise. 
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C. First Compromise Proposal 
The union's senior negotiator questions the analyst's reason-
ing and points out that while the union is indifferent among 
the five alternatives, the management need not be. The analyst 
interjects, saying that this is exactly the case and that if the 
union were to select say, el, the management may consider 
such an offer as negotiation in bad faith. This is because, 
although, el brings forth concessions made by the union, it 
may be considered by the management as a worse offer than 
the opening position UO. The management's utility level may 
be higher at UO than at el. 
The senior negotiator fully agrees with the analyst and says 
that this is his very reason for selecting e2 and not e3, e4, 
or e5. Proposing e2 is constructive because it shows the 
union's willingness to make concessions, e2 is better for the 
management than UO. At the same time, it gives the union 
flexibility in its future offers. The union, during the later stages 
of negotiation, may present compromise proposals which are 
better for the management but which do not require the union 
to make any concessions. 
The union, for example, can reply with e3 or c4 to the man-
agement's counter offer to c2. The selection of one of these 
alternatives (c3 or c4) would depend on the management's 
reply to c2; on the degree of their concessions. Moreover, he 
continues, selection of c2 may lead the management to assume 
that the union is much less interested in salary level than in 
the bonus. This may lead the management to put pressure on 
the union to accept a higher number of widgets. The union 
may accept it under condition that the management accepts 
a higher level of salary. This may give the union a strategic 
advantage over the management. 
The analyst listens to the senior negotiator's arguments and 
suggests that the current utility does not reflect all the prefer-
ences of the union. He proposes to include offer flexibility and 
the probability of management's negative counter-offers to any 
given offer. This expansion of the utility function is rejected 
by the union because of its complexity, data requirements 
and the difficulty of making a meaningful comparison of 
offer attributes. The senior negotiator states that an attempt 
to measure everything is impractical and introduces endless 
decomposition of attributes and the vicious circle of strategic 
interaction (20) . 
The analyst then suggests decreasing the concession level 
earlier agreed to by the union and selecting an alternative 
which is on or near the efficient frontier. For example, the 
union may select e•, depicted in Fig. 2, as its reply to MO. 
The union's utility level at e• is higher than at c2, that is 
Uu(c•) > Uu(c2), and thus-from the union's viewpoint-the 
concession level is smaller. 
The senior negotiator replies that this may significantly 
weaken the union's arguments in the future . The union, with 
the selection of c2, makes a significant concession and this, if 
needed, can be explained to the management. The significant 
distance from UO to c2 can be easily shown, for example with 
the use of Fig. 2 with removal of the union's indifference 
curve. The union, proposing c2, makes concessions measured 
by the changes in the levels of both negotiating issues (salary 
and production). These issues are what the two sides are 
negotiating about. Therefore, a significant change cannot be 
dismissed by the opponent. 
Thus, the senior negotiator argues, choosing c• would 
amount to making small steps without attempting to build an 
understanding between the parties, reducing the tensions and 
making cooperative moves (8). Offer c2 shows a significant 
concession made with respect to one issue and a small one 
to another. It shows the union's willingness to negotiate 
efficiently but cautiously. 
Assume, he continues, that the management replies to c• 
with an offer which is only marginally better than MO. 
We would have to reciprocate in kind and the negotiations 
may take a long time or end in a deadlock. We have our 
constituency and this negotiation is only a part of our respon- · 
sibilities. He finishes with questions to the analyst: Can you 
assure us that the result of "small steps" negotiation will yield 
a better compromise for the union? Can you assess the increase 
in the union's utility of a compromise achieved after selecting 
c• as opposed to the selection of c2? 
Decision analysis does not address this questions and the 
analyst decides to discontinue the discussion and to concen-
trate instead on "post-settlement settlement" (5) . He thinks 
that although the compromise the two parties achieve may 
be inefficient, he may be able to propose an offer that will 
benefit both sides. 
D. Offer Exchange and Actual Compromise 
The negotiation continues along the lines proposed by the 
senior negotiator. The union replies to MO = (83200; 5100) 
with Ul = (S5200; 1800), (note that Ul = c2). The man-
agement responds with a counter-offer Ml = (84000; 4500) 
which the union considers as an improvement over J\'10. 
However, the union believes that the management's offer 
does not match the union's concession. The senior negotiator 
points out that with the earlier selection of Ul the union 
has now flexibility in its response. It may propose an offer 
which requires a very small or no decrease in its utility 
while maintaining negotiations in good faith . This is because 
the management should perceive the new proposal as being 
significantly better than UL Moreover, he adds, the counter-
offer should visibly reduce the distance between the union's 
and the management's positions (see Fig. 4) and indicate their 
willingness to get both parties closer to a compromise. 
Taking the above into considerations, the union proposes 
U2 = ($5200; 2700) to which the management replies with 
M2 = ($4400; 4100). Both the union and the management 
realize that the compromise is close and, after a long meet-
ing, they agree on the compromise UM = ($4700; 3300). 
The negotiation process leading to the compromise UM is 
illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The two parties achieve a compromise that seems to satisfy 
them. We argue that the union's decisions were based on the 
rational premises; they included internal aspects of the problem 
(tradeoffs and utility) and external aspects (opponent's needs, 
reactions, and other stakeholders). The union made moves 
analyzing its criteria and determined its utility function. Based 
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Fig. 4. Union/management negotiations in offer space. 
on this analysis, it selected an offer ( Ul ), with a strategic 
perspective. This offer, from the decision analysis viewpoint, 
brought forth concessions that the union was earlier willing 
to make. The concessions were significant and they could be 
presented to the management as such. It is also a flexible offer, 
as it allows the union to make further offers without making 
any concessions on its part but which would increase the man-
agement's utility and thus be considered by the management 
as concessions. Moreover, at no point in time the union could 
be accused of making negotiations in bad faith, each of its 
contemplated or actual offers was getting the two parties closer 
to a compromise in the sense that it decreased the distance 
which negotiators may use (e.g. , the block measure). 
E. Post-Settlement Settlements and Accuracy 
Union and management achieved the compromise U J.I. The 
analyst now needs to determine if UM is efficient. This is 
a straightforward exercise that requires the use of Theorem 
I, given in Section IV, if the analytical form of the two 
utility functions is known. Thus, the analyst must determine 
the management's utility. Assume, that the management is 
willing to cooperate and that the analyst determines that the 
management 's indifference curves are as depicted in Fig. 6. 
This implies that the compromise UM is inefficient. Realizing 
this he suggests a post-settlement settlement. Offers D or P2 
should be considered as a final compromise. He adds that, with 
the selection of P2, the management will be able to increase 
its utility value from 25.1 at UM to 26.8. 
The management seems reluctant to accept the analyst's 
arguments and one of the team members states that he really 
does not see any improvements. The analyst explains that 
from his discussion with the team he was able to precisely 
determine the management's utility and this allowed him to 
propose a compromise better than UNI. The member raises 
the issue of accuracy and says that the tradeoffs really reflect 
the average perception of all the members and cannot be 
considered precisely. The member therefore asks the analyst 
to conduct sensitivity analysis. 
The analyst determines the range of changes in the trade-
off values for which UM is efficient and for which the P2 
is efficient and presents them to the management team. The 
discussion then concentrates on the issue whether the trade-
off value between widgets and salary is indeed exactly 2.7. 
It continues for some time, when the management realizes 
that this discussion is meaningless because they cannot give 
a precise value. Then, the analyst asks management to rank 
the three alternatives UM, D, and P2. The management team 
selects D as a clearly better option than UNI, but is not able 
to differentiate between D and P2. 
The analyst returns to the union representatives and suggest 
that, instead of UM, D be selected and that if the union agrees 
the management may be willing to accept this offer. He points 
out, that the union prefers D over UM and, therefore, they 
should accept it, or even suggest P2 as the final compromise. 
The discussion following the analyst's presentation closely 
resembles one he earlier had with the management. In effect 
UM remains the accepted compromise. 
Note that we considered here a highly unrealistic situation 
with the analyst having full information about both parties. 
Most often the knowledge about the opponent is only partial. 
As we will show in Section IV, even small changes in the 
evaluation of the utilities may cause significant changes in the 
CC' s and move the efficient solutions from the boundary to 
the interior of X or vice versa. 
Ill. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
We consider two party negotiations over issues on which 
certain constraints are imposed. The negotiations are con-
ducted in the offer space ~ which is an n-dimensional space 
of real numbers. The set X ~ ~ of feasible options is defined 
by constraints which both parties must obey and it is assumed 
convex. Utilities UM(x) and Uu(x) , of the two parties are 
functions defined over X and its "neighborhood;" they are in 
general convex (or concave) functions. Equality or inequality 
constraints on these functions therefore define convex curves 
and regions in X . 
For the most part, we assume that the parties ' utilities are 
stable over time. This is not really a restriction with respect 
to our objectives since it is easy to understand changing 
preferences as a cause of non efficient compromises (the 
solution to the changed problem is non efficient with respect 
to the original problem); indeed our intention is to show that 
even with stable utilities there are reasons for terminating 
negotiation with an inefficient compromise. 
We make the assumption that each party knows his or her 
own utility function, but not the other party' s. This reflects 
the fact that in real-world negotiations the exact preferences 
of the other party are incompletely known to each side, and 
this information is often guarded because it may be disad-
vantageous to reveal one's true preferences. However, it may 
be possible to make a qualitative estimate of the other party's 
utility function, and we will explore this possibility. Indeed, the 
concepts we develop will make it possible to provide support 
without having the utility function of either party. 
Incomplete information as a cause of inefficiency has been 
previously studied and is well-known [21]-[24]. These studies 
demonstrate this in fairly restricted negotiations in which one 
characteristic is unknown, but strong assumptions are made 
about the rest of the problem and the negotiators' cognitive 
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capabilities. Lax and Sebenius [14, Ch. 7] look at more general 
negotiations and conclude that under incomplete information, 
the tension between creating and claiming value is a primary 
cause of inefficient outcomes. 
We are more concerned with the manner in which tactics, 
strategic moves and cognitive limitations, rather than in-
complete information, lead to inefficient compromises. These 
issues include trust and animosity, external pressure, flexibility 
considerations, other decision problems and parties encoun-
tered, anticipation of future negotiations, and manipulation 
of the parties' motivations. A typical demonstration will be 
that a small change in the assessment of the opponent's 
utility function or additional considerations of the opponent's 
reactions, can result in a drastic change in the character 
of the negotiations, e.g., converting it from distributive to 
cooperative, and turning the compromise from nearly efficient 
to clearly inefficient. 
Definition 1: The (CC) is the subset of the feasible set 
X ~ ~ which contains only efficient solutions. 
For unconstrained problems (X = ~) the CC was first 
discussed by Edgeworth [25]. In constrained problems (X C 
~). the CC may be contained in X, partially contained and 
partially determined by the frontiers (constraint boundaries) 
of X, or fully located on the frontiers of X [25]. The CC in 
offer-space corresponds to the Pareto frontier in utility-space. 
Thus, the Pareto frontier and the CC are fully defined by the 
two utility functions and X . 
Further, we characterize the nature of the relationship by 
defining the opposition between two negotiating parties. We 
use the term "opposition" in a general sense referring to 
relationships between the motivations or preferences of the 
two agents with respect to each other. Intuitively, the strength 
of opposition is the level of (dis)agreement between the 
parties at any point p E ~ or over a region of possible 
offers, X ~ ~. Strict or strong opposition is typical of 
strictly competitive games when any gain for one party can 
be achieved only at a loss for another party. At the other 
extreme, weak or a complete lack of opposition means that 
both parties simultaneously achieve either losses or gains. 
This distinction corresponds roughly to the win-lose and win-
win types of negotiations. Our formal characterization of 
opposition allows for a finer distinction of types of negotiation 
and more comprehensive analysis. In particular, it can help the 
parties obtain an intuitive, qualitative understanding of how 
different regions of X are characterized by different levels of 
opposition, and can thus motivate and guide the search for 
solutions that release the tension between cooperative versus 
distributive bargaining. 
Since opposition between the two parties can vary consider-
ably over the offer space (with one pair of positions considered 
highly antagonistic and another pair being highly cooperative), 
we need to describe the local properties of the relationship. We 
begin with the opposition at any point of the offer space ~. 
Definition 2: The parties are in local strict opposition at a 
point x E ~ iff for all points x' E ~ that are sufficiently close 
to x (i .e., for some e, e > 0, such that Vx'Jlx' - xii< e), an 
increase of one utility can be achieved only at the expense of 
a decrease of the other utility. 
The above definition can be usefully restated using vector 
calculus as follows. Recall that the level curves or indifference 
curves of a utility function U(x) are curves of constant 
utility value U(x) = c, for some c. The gradient \iU(x) 
at a point x is therefore perpendicular to the level curve 
of U(x) that goes through x. Further, U(x) increases most 
rapidly at x in the direction of the gTadient, and it decreases 
most rapidly in the opposite direction. The rate of increase 
in any direction e is given by e · \iU(x). As discussed in 
Section IV, points of local strict opposition (Definition 2) 
are exactly those at which the gradients of the two utility 
functions point in opposite directions, i.e., x E ~ such 
that vUi(x) = -k'VU2(x),k>O, and this property could 
constitute an alternative definition of points of local strict 
opposition. Using the geometric interpretation of the gradients, 
these points may also be called tangential points, i.e., points 
where level curves meet tangentially. 
Definition 3: The parties are in local nonstrict opposition 
at a point x E ~ iff they are not in local strict opposition at 
x, i.e., iff it is possible for both parties to raise their utilities 
by moving an infinitesimal distance from x . 
We also introduce two additional types of opposition based 
on the tension between the two parties at an offer in terms of 
the cooperativeness or conflict between the interests (utilities) 
of the two sides. Since each utility gradient represents the 
"central interests" or most preferred direction in which a 
party would like to move, if the two directions are close to 
each other, the two parties have more scope for cooperatively 
improving upon the compromise than if the two gradients were 
in largely opposing directions.3 
Definition 4: The parties are in local weak opposition at a 
point x E ~ iff Y'U1(x.Y'U2(x) 2: 0, i.e., iff the gradients at 
x of the two utility functions form an acute or right angle. 
Definition 5: The parties are in local strong opposition at a 
point x E ~ iff Y'U1(x) · \iVi(x) < 0, i.e., iff the gradients at 
x form an obtuse angle. 
While local opposition allows us to discuss the nature of 
the opposition for an individual position-which is in or out 
of the feasible set X-such as an initial offer, a counter-offer, 
and a compromise, we can define global opposition which 
characterizes-and is restricted to--the entire set of feasible 
offers. 
Definition 6: The parties are in global strict (nonstrict, 
weak, strong) opposition iff for every x E X they are in local 
strict (nonstrict, weak, strong) opposition. 
Strict and nonstrict global oppositions are complementary 
cases. We will show that under global strict opposition the CC 
is identical to the whole of X. In the case of global nonstrict 
opposition, the CC lies on the frontier of X. There are also 
negotiation cases with local nonstrict opposition at some points 
of X and strict opposition at others. In these cases the (CC) 
is either on the frontier of X or, more often, partially on the 
frontier and partially in the interior of X . 
Another type of opposition that is intermediate in scale 
between local and global opposition is offer-pair opposition. 
3This can be formally proved by considering the width of the band of 
directions that would result in joint improvement, given any two values for 
the gradients. 
332 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS. MAN. AND CYBERNETICS-PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 28. NO. 3, MAY 1998 
It is defined, as the name implies, on a pair of points in offer 
space. Given that the two parties have made offers x1 and x2 
respectively, the offer-pair opposition between the two parties 
is V'U1(x)l) · V'U2(x2). and its nature can be characterized as 
strong or weak as before, based on whether its value is negative 
or positive. Offer-pair opposition is useful in modeling the 
relationship between the two parties at early stages of the 
negotiation when there is no single point that is genuinely 
under consideration as a final compromise. In such situations, 
the gradients at the offers indicate which directions are most 
preferred for each party, and they may choose to take this into 
account in concession making. 
A curve that is closely allied to the CC and useful in 
conceptualizing the preference and efficiency structure of the 
offer space is the following: 
Definition 7: The tangential point curve (TPC) is the set 
of points x E R at which the two utility functions satisfy 
V'Ui(x) = -kV'U2(x), k > 0, i.e., points at which the level 
curves of the two utility functions are tangential to each other. 
Part of this curve coincides with the CC under certain 
conditions (one of which is that the relevant portion of the 
T PC must be within the feasible set), and thus represents the 
efficient set under those conditions. However its more useful 
property is the fact that the gradients of both utilities, anywhere 
in R, always point roughly toward the TPC regardless of 
where the TPC may be located (in or out of the feasible 
set); this helps in visualizing the relationship between the two 
parties when depicted as a field of arrows. Put another way, 
"CC tends toward T PC," and a special case of this property 
is the result that when the TPC is entirely outside the feasible 
set, the Pareto-optimal set (CC) must lie on the boundary 
of X, on those segments that are closest to the T PC. These 
aspects are explored in Section IV. 
IV. OPPOSITION AND COMPROMISES 
A. Conditions for Efficient Compromises 
The efficiency of the compromise U J.l depends, for a given 
value of union's utility, on the management's utility function. 
Assume that UM is efficient. The management's utility level 
curve or indifference curve, for simplicity assumed linear, is 
depicted in Fig. 4. Moving from UM results in an increase in 
one party ' s utility at the expense of the other party's utility . 
This is because the parties are in strict opposition at UM. 
Given a pair of analytic utility functions, the following 
theorem establishes purely local criteria that can be applied 
to determine whether a given position is an efficient point 
or not. Alternatively, the theorem can be viewed as the 
defining equation of the CC (efficient set) in offer space. In 
unconstrained negotiations, only the first half of the theorem 
can apply, and the theorem effectively says that the TPC 
(tangential point curve) is identical to CC. 
The results in this section can be easily generalized to 
higher dimensional vector spaces (m parties negotiating over 
n issues), but we will keep the discussion to two dimen-
sions to continue our case study and illustrate concepts ge-
ometrically. Further, these results hold under the slightly 
weaker requirement of quasiconvexity rather than convexity 
of Uu(x) , U111(x), and B(x). 
Let B(x) = 0 denote the equation of the boundary of X, 
defining x E X iff B(x) 2:: 0. Then V' B(x) is the outward 
normal direction to the boundary of X at x . 
Theorem 1: Offer x• EX is efficient iff, either 
A) x• is in the interior of X and the local opposition at 
x• is strict, i.e., 
V'Uu(x•) = -k'VU111(x•) (2) 
where k is some positive constant, or 
B) x• is on the boundary of X, and for some a ,{3 ~ 0 
aV'Uu(x•) + f3'VU111(x•) = 'V B(x•) (3) 
given convex/concave utility functions and a convex feasible 
set. 
Qualitative Explanation 
The theorem treats interior points and boundary points of 
the feasible set X differently, and part A essentially says that 
an interior point is efficient iff it is a point at which some 
level curves of the two parties meet tangentially. A utility 
gradient indicates the direction in which its agent would most 
prefer to go if he only considered small immediate gains, and 
any direction making an acute angle with the gradient (i .e., 
any direction d such that d · V'U;(x) > 0) is a direction in 
which the utility can be improved. Therefore, if the two agents 
do not have exactly opposing gradients, there is a direction 
in which both can jointly improve their position from the 
current one, and the current position is not efficient. So local 
strict opposition is a necessary condition-and sufficient, with 
convex/concave utility functions-for an interior point to be 
efficient. 
However, there may be no tangential points within X (either 
because they are all outside X or because there exist no 
tangential points at all for the given utility functions) . In 
that case the efficient set will lie on the boundary of X. 
The local conditions that identify which boundary points are 
efficient are given in part B of the theorem, and essentially 
say that there is no direction for improvement within the set 
X at a boundary efficient point. The expression aV'Uu(x•)+ 
f3V'UM(x•) defines a convex cone of directions at x•, and 
when the outward normal to the boundary lies within this 
cone, any direction into X at x• must make an obtuse angle 
with at least one of the two utility gradients, thereby failing 
to improve that utility. 
Proof' A) Every point x• in X, must lie on some unique 
level curve of each utility function, and the level curve of 
Uu(x) that passes through x• is described by the equation 
Uu(x) = Uu(x•). This level curve defines the boundary of a 
set C = {xx s.t. Uu(x) 2:: Uu(x•)}. Clearly, x• is efficient 
iff UM(x) is maximized within Cat x• (points outside Care 
eliminated because those points are dominated with respect to 
the Uu criterion, and points at which UM is not maximum 
are dominated by points at which it is). Thus we convert the 
problem of maximizing both Uu(x) and UM(x) over X to 
one of maximizing Uu(x) given Uu(x) 2:: Uu(x•). 
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This constrained optimization problem is easily solved 
by the standard method of Lagrange (see, e.g., (27)), and 
immediately gives us the equation 'VUM(x•) +A'VUu(x•) = 
0, A ~ 0, as the general form of the solution, where A is 
the Lagrange multiplier. This equation is rewritten as (2) to 
convey the geometric properties of the solution. 
B) Since the conversion of the two-criterion maximiza-
tion problem to the constrained single-criterion maximization 
problem is general, we have the identical requirement, to 
maximize UM(x) given Uu(x) ~ Uu(x•) now, however, with 
an additional constraint, B(x) = 0. Once again applying the 
method of Lagrange, we get the general form of the solution 
as 'VUM(x•) +A'V'Uu(x•)+µ'VB(x•) = 0, A ~ O,µ,P 0. µ 
is positive or negative according to whether the inner or outer 
normal direction of B(x) is considered the gradient \7 B(x); in 
our case, with B(x) ::; 0 defining the region X, µis negative. 
A simple rewriting of this expression obtains (3). + 
Note that parts A and B of the theorem are exhaustive but 
not mutually exclusive because when both conditions apply 
we have tangential points on the boundary. 
We now discuss special cases of opposition and their 
implications for the nature of the CC. 
B. Strict Opposition 
Global opposition requires that at every point in X the local 
opposition is always the same (strict or nonstrict). 
Theorem 2: Assume that the agents' preferences differ. 
They are in global strict opposition in X if Uu and UM are 
linear and in local strict opposition at any one point in X . 
Proof: If Uu and UM are linear, the gradients of the two 
utilities are constant vectors all over X. Thus the two gradients 
align (in opposite directions) either everywhere or nowhere in 
X. Therefore given any point of local strict opposition in X, 
global strict opposition is implied. + 
The converse is not true; given global strict opposition 
(Vx E X\?Uu(x) = -kUM(x)) , the two utility functions 
need not be linear. Any pair of nonlinear functions such that 
one is the negative of the other satisfies this condition. A 
corollary to the theorem is that global strict opposition with 
one linear utility implies that the other utility function must 
also be linear. 
The implication of Theorem 2 is that for the linear utilities 
and local strict opposition, the indifference curves are tan-
gential at every point in X, and the whole set X of feasible 
solutions is efficient. For linear utilities without local strict 
opposition, the entire interior of X is inefficient and the 
efficient set lies on the boundary. (This is a special case of 
the theorem involving monotonicity below.) This is not the 
case for strictly convex (concave) utilities or when at least 
one of the utilities is nonlinear (Fig. 3, for example). Thus, 
in the case of strictly opposing parties, a linear approximation 
of the nonlinear utilities may result in significant errors and 
make impossible discrimination of offer efficiency. 
From Theorem 2 it follows that in the linear case and strict 
initial opposition negotiations always terminate in an efficient 
compromise. We consider this special case, with condition 
(2) holding between the initial points, i.e., with \7Uu(u0 ) = 
2 3 4 5 Widgets (w) 
Fig. 5. Local strict opposition and inefficient compromises 
-k\?Uu(mo). The nonlinear situation is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
The CC is nonlinear and, depending on the initial offers 
and set X, it may initially be on the boundary of X. Strict 
local opposition (and thus efficiency) at the initial points 
does not ensure that negotiations will terminate in an efficient 
compromise, as the figure illustrates. 
If Cl or C2 is the compromise then it is inefficient because 
the parties' utilities are not tangential at these points. Both 
parties may increase their respective utilities if they select 
any point from the dashed line. An efficient compromise is 
at point D. 
C. Nonstrict Opposition 
In the case of global nonstrict opposition, that is, if ~x E X 
such that \?Uu(x) = -k'VUM(x), the CC lies on the 
boundary of X because condition (a) of Theorem I does 
not apply in X and thus (b) holds. We illustrate the case 
of global nonstrict opposition with a revised example of 
union-management negotiation and, as before, take the union's 
perspective. The two parties make the same initial proposals 
and counter-offers and reach the same compromise as previ-
ously. As we indicate in Fig. 6, the only difference is in the 
management's utility. The change in the utility from the one 
depicted in Fig. 4 is not very significant. In fact, it could be 
even smaller and the effect would be the same (for illustrative 
purposes we made a greater change in the indifference curves), 
that is the achieved compromise UM would be inefficient. The 
same behavior of the two parties leads now to inefficiency 
because of different, than in Fig. 4, management's utility . In 
this case the CC consists of two intervals [UO, P2] , [P2, MO]. 
The strength of opposition depends both on objectives and 
preferences. The management's objectives remain the same, 
it wants more of widgets and less of salary, but the trade-off 
coefficients change. The management is now more interested 
in salary (see Fig. 6) than it was in the example illustrated 
in Fig. 4. This small change moves negotiations from local 
strict opposition at some points within X to global nonstrict 
opposition. This phenomenon has been observed in both real-
life situations and in laboratory experiments (19]. Note that 
since this change may not be known to the other party, the 
sequence of offers and counter-offers may be the same as 
illustrated in Fig. 4. 
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2 3 4 5 WidgetsM 
Fig. 6. Global nonstrict opposition and an inefficient compromise. 
D. Weak and Strong Opposition 
To consider the conditions for the weak and strong forms 
of opposition we make two assumptions. One, often used in 
economics and utility theory, is that the utilities are monotonic 
functions. The second assumption is that rational agents will 
not negotiate issues on which they are both indifferent. While 
strategic misrepresentation is possible, that is, a party may 
introduce an issue which has no implications for its own utility, 
this issue has to be at least relevant for the opponent. The 
implication of this assumption is that 
'v'x EX: 8Uu(x)/8xi 
= 0--+ 8UM(x)/8xj i' 0, j = 1,2 (5) 
(and similarly with the utilities switched). 
Theorem 3: Given Uu(x) and UM(x) monotonic, and no 
irrelevant issues, if there is local weak opposition at any 
one point in X, then the two parties are in global nonstrict 
opposition over X . 
It is not possible to prove a stronger result: e.g. , local weak 
opposition does not imply global weak opposition; the strength 
of opposition can vary across X, even under the restrictive 
monotonicity assumption. However, the above theorem is quite 
useful since it concerns efficiency (global nonstrict opposition 
implies that efficient points are located only on the boundary, 
due to theorem 1). 
Theorem 4 (complementary to 3). Given monotonic Uu(x) 
and Uu(x) and no irrelevant issues, if there is local strict 
opposition at any point within X, then the two parties are in 
global strong opposition. 
Proofs of 3 and 4: Monotonicity implies that the deriva-
tives do not change sign, i.e., each derivative is always 
nonnegative or nonpositive. Thus each of the components of 
the gradient vectors maintains the same sign throughout X. 
Since V'Uu(x•) = -kV'UM(x•) at an efficient point x•, it 
follows that the corresponding components of the two gradient 
vectors must have opposite signs or be both zero at x• . The 
I alter possibility is ruled out by the assumption of no irrelevant 
issues. By monotonicity, the signs of the components at x• 
must hold throughout X. Consequently, if a tangential point 
exists within X the dot product of the two vectors must be 
negative throughout X (i.e., the opposition is globally strong). 
Since local weak opposition at a point x' E X is defined by 
V'Uu(x') · V'UM(x') > 0 (6) 
it follows that it is not possible to have an efficient point within 
X and simultaneously have weak opposition anywhere in X . 
That is, local weak opposition at any point in X implies that 
there are no efficient points in the interior of X. + 
Theorem 5 (Generalization of Theorem 4). If Uu(x) and 
UM(x) are monotonic and the gTadients at any one point in X 
are directed into opposite quadrants of X, then the two parties 
are in global strong opposition over X. 
Proof' As explained with Theorem 3, monotonicity 
alone implies that each of the components of the gradient 
vectors maintains the same sign throughout X . When the 
two vectors are directed into opposite quadrants we have 
V'TUu(x)V'UM(x) < 0, which implies that each pair of 
corresponding components of the two vectors must be of 
opposite signs. Consequently the dot product of the two 
vectors must be negative in X, V'Uu(x) · V'UM(x) < 0, and 
the opposition is globally strong. + 
A complementary theorem for gradients falling into the 
adjacent quadrants can be proved; this is a generalization of 
Theorem 3. 
V. RATIONALITIES AND EFFICIENCY 
In Section II, we discussed negotiations in which the two 
parties achieved a compromise with efficiency depending on 
the nature of the opposition. The efficiency conditions for 
different forms of opposition were developed in Section IV, 
and showed that any feasible offer might be an efficient 
solution, not just on the boundary of X . The conditions are 
specified for utility functions defined on the problem attributes 
and the parties' preferences, and the discussion of inefficient 
compromises thus far has been based on the structure of the 
underlying problem and preferences. In this section we will 
consider both problem-structural and behavioral reasons for 
inefficiency and present arguments as to why rational agents 
do not, and often should not, select an efficient compromise. 
A. Opposition and Efficiency 
The results obtained in Section IV-D also hold for offer-pair 
opposition. Therefore, knowledge of the opposition between 
the initial pair of offers provides information about the possible 
location of the efficient points. For example, given weak 
opposition between this pair, all the efficient points are on 
the boundaries of feasible set X. If the boundaries are known 
to both parties then "rational" agents can guess at and ap-
proximate the efficient set. If, however, the boundaries are not 
known or X = ~. then rational, i.e., utility maximizing parties 
cannot achieve an efficient compromise. This is because given 
weak opposition any offer can be improved and there are no 
efficient compromises. Thus, feasibility plays a critical role in 
weakly opposing parties . 
In the complementary theorem's situation, since the op-
position is strong, efficient points are likely to be in the 
interior of X. This implies that the constraints defining X may 
be insignificant and only the parties' utilities define efficient 
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compromises. Thus, the acceptability of the offer to the parties 
becomes critical. The compromise's efficiency depends on 
accurate assessment of one's own party's and one's opponent's 
utilities . 
Weak opposition allows for win-win negotiations while 
strong opposition suggests win-lose negotiations. A significant 
effort is often made to move the parties from the win-lose 
situation to win-win. This requires change in the opposition 
and, therefore, in their utilities. If successful, such a change 
requires joint agreement on the set of feasible solutions. 
We assumed that utilities are stable over time. The problem-
structural properties may, however, lead negotiators to change 
their utilities so that the set of available compromises is defined 
by objective constraints and not solely by subjective utilities. 
Attempts to modify utilities are usually considered desirable if 
they allow one to move from win-lose to win-win negotiations 
and expand the "pie." Thus, an initially efficient solution may 
become inefficient. 
Weak (or strong or strict) opposition, when based on prob-
lem attributes, are structural notions directly characterizing the 
underlying interests of the parties. While they may be powerful 
in influencing the progress of negotiation and the outcomes, 
they are not the sole determining factors. 
8. Attributes of the Agent 
The attributes of the agent are all the characteristics that 
describe the decision maker and her behavior. These include 
knowledge and cognitive capability, risk attitude, ability and 
willingness to cooperate, sense of responsibility, power, and 
leadership. Preferences describe the values and tradeoffs of the 
agent but they are defined on the problem attribute values and 
do not take into account the agent's attributes. 
Recognition of human cognitive limitations led Simon [29] 
to propose a much weaker form of rationality, namely bounded 
rationality. Obviously, negotiators who are only partially ra-
tional in the utilitarian sense and employ satisficing behavior 
may never be able to achieve efficient compromises. However, 
fully rational negotiators also have to balance the problem and 
the agent attributes. 
The attributes of the agent may modify the choice mecha-
nism. This has been illustrated with the consideration of the 
impact of relative power and time pressure on making offers 
in bargaining [30]. Perception of power may impact the scope 
of concessions but it may also cause selection of different 
offers for a given utility value. For a given concession level 
(measured with the utility function), the party may select an 
offer which yields the lowest utility of the opponent. This 
may lead to a different sequence of offers and an inefficient 
compromise. If such a compromise is achieved then rational 
negotiators should make a joint attempt to improve it. 
In decision analysis, risk and risk attitude is associated 
with the outcomes and used in estimation of the expected 
utility . Post-settlement settlement introduces additional risk 
which negotiators may not be willing to accept. Opening the 
negotiation process anew may endanger what had already been 
achieved and, therefore, the negotiators may knowingly accept 
an inefficient compromise. 
C. Process Attributes 
Negotiation is a process that has its own process attributes 
such as time, effort, communication and monetary require-
ments. For example, in our simple case, the parties achieved 
a compromise based on the "split the difference" principle 
because they perceived that the differences between the two 
last offers (U2 and M2 in Fig. 4) do not warrant spending 
more time and effort on further discussions. This is an example 
of tradeoffs between the utility of a decision and the agent and 
process attribute values. Obviously, the split the difference 
approach may result in an inefficient compromise. 
Consideration of the phases of negotiations introduce a 
qualitative difference between the initial offers, intermediary 
offers and the final offers [JO]. The first offer is made only after 
the agent secured sufficient process resources in the prenego-
tiation phase. Offers made during the phases of differences 
exploration and their reduction deplete these resources. Thus, 
a potential offer is evaluated not only in its contribution to 
the final compromise but also in its resource implications for 
both parties (31]. 
Negotiations may be concluded if a party underestimated 
the resource requirements and its resources are depleted. More 
often, in the final bargaining phase the parties realize that the 
compromise is within reach. This may significantly change 
their perspective as the parties realize that the remaining 
resources can be used elsewhere. Since the process resources 
are often very expensive (e.g., the time of the executives 
and managers) and generic because they can be used else-
where, there is strong competition for their distribution among 
different activities. 
Negotiators with the achievement of a compromise become 
able to use their time and effort on other issues and solve 
other problems. As the union chief negotiator said, there is 
a constituency and many other issues have to be addressed. 
Students, in the experiments discussed in [6], completed the 
exercise and saw no reason to move from the achieved 
compromises. It may be that they thought that the time they 
saved in accepting the compromises would be better used 
elsewhere. The key issue here is that with the achievement 
of a compromise the trade-off analysis changes from the 
comparison of potential gains and losses between offers to 
comparison of these offers with expected gains from solving 
other problems using the available resources. Possible excep-
tions may occur with professional negotiators and advisors 
who are being paid for the process of securing the best possible 
compromise. 
D. Meta-Utility 
One may argue that the deficiency of the above discussion 
is its restriction to a utility defined only on the offer space, 
that is, on decision attributes. When all the attributes are taken 
into account then rational agents would always achieve effi-
cient compromises. We accept this argument; on philosophical 
grounds the utilitarian approach will indeed result in efficiency. 
The question is how this can be translated into formal analysis 
and support mechanisms in the situation when some of the 
attributes are initially unknown and may never be known 
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while other attributes are the result of the process which is 
to be controlled with the utility considerations. We do not 
know of any realistic approach which takes this into account. 
Game theory, negotiation analysis and other decision-theoretic 
approaches allow for only a few attributes of the agent and/or 
of the process and assume that their values are constant during 
negotiations. 
An attempt to apply the utilitarian approach introduces a 
significant complexity to problem representation and solution. 
There are no grounds to assume that there is only one 
utility. On the contrary, Nozick [ 12] argues that at least three 
different utilities need be considered, the evidentially expected 
utility (a deterministic case is considered here), the causally 
expected utility and the symbolic utility. While efficiency can 
be determined with respect to one or two utilities, its absence 
cannot suggest that the decision maker is not rational. Due to 
the additional dimensions defining other attributes than those 
of the problem, the existence of competitive options and other 
decision problems, and different utilities one can assume that 
the rational agents will achieve an efficient compromise only 
in exceptional situations. Unless they disregard a number of 
aspects and features of the overall negotiation situation they 
may have important reasons not to follow the efficient frontier. 
Even if all is known to all parties and the meta-utilities can 
be determined there is the issue of certainty. A negotiator may 
assume that the opponent is rational with probability of one 
but not with certainty. This allows the opponent to attempt to 
change this probability with the selection of inefficient offers. 
The argument may be such as the one given by the union nego-
tiator in making offer e3 (see Fig. 2). Varoufakis, (32, Ch. 6] 
shows that such a behavior may allow one party to achieve an 
improved compromise which, however, need not be efficient. 
VI. IMPLICATION FOR ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT 
The prescriptive representations of the supported party 
assumes that all relevant problem, agent and process attributes 
are modeled and a meta-utility is constructed. There may be 
two reasons for such an effort. One is to better understand 
oneself and the problem, and such an effort is worthwhile. 
The other reason is to follow the model's prescriptions. We 
discussed the difficulty in constructing such a model but the 
most important drawback to following its prescriptions is 
the negotiator's subservience to mechanistic moves, inducing 
an inability to be creative and to understand the rationality 
guiding the opponent's moves. 
We derived the concept of the opposition from that of 
utility and formulated theorems which allow negotiators to 
determine the set of efficient compromises. We also presented 
arguments against basing offer formulation on utility , and the 
limitations of utility-based approaches to negotiation analysis 
and support. This apparent contradiction can be resolved if-as 
we advocate here-opposition and its role are viewed in more 
general terms. This is because opposition may reflect some 
of the attributes of the agents and the process in addition to 
those of the problem. 
We have introduced four types of opposition and their 
implications. These are clearly more basic and therefore of 
wider applicability than utilities; for any type of opposition we 
have many different utilities. We also think that opposition is 
a social phenomenon which can be easily understood because 
it is closely related to conflict or consonance. 
Opposition can be approximated or modified with elements 
(attributes) that are difficult to measure and embedded in 
utility . The question which the negotiator has to answer is 
whether an additional issue or attribute weakens or strengthens 
the opposition and to what degree. The "degree" need not be 
precise as it is sufficient to know whether the two parties 
remain strictly opposed or whether the opposition moves from 
strong to weak or vice versa. 
Specification of the nature of the opposition allows for 
approximation of the efficient set. In the case of weak op-
position this set may be approximated with some accuracy 
because even without knowing the utility functions some 
boundaries will clearly be efficient. However, this seems 
less relevant than the knowledge of the critical boundaries. 
This knowledge allows the parties to focus their efforts on 
softening of the binding constraints. In the prenegotiation 
phase the parties assess the strength of the opposition. If it 
is weak then they identify the binding constraints and during 
the phase of difference exploration discuss the possibility of 
softening them. Then the parties may concentrate on offers 
which are defined by the agreed upon constraints or in their 
neighborhood. 
A significant difference between the use of utility and 
opposition is that the latter opens up the possibility of in-
cluding all perceived attributes (including agent and process 
attributes) without their formal representation and without a 
laborious process of preference elicitation. Utility is obtained 
through the bottom-up analytic approach that requires the 
decision maker to provide a comprehensive specification of 
all relevant attributes and to make a thorough and detailed 
comparison between them. Opposition is more of a qualitative 
concept and allows for a holistic approach. The decision maker 
may conduct analysis having an intuitive understanding of 
the strength of the opposition, with no specification of the 
underlying attributes and preferences. 
Another difference is in the consideration of the process 
with respect to joint gains. Joint gains cannot be achieved if 
the parties are in strict opposition and do not wish to modify it. 
The efficiency of win/lose negotiations is defined by parties' 
utilities. Although this type of negotiation cannot be ruled 
out, experienced negotiators and mediators make an effort to 
change the nature of the opposition from strict to strong or 
even weak. Here too, the analysis of the opposition facilitates 
the process and may help to "increase the pie." 
Weakening of the opposition moves the set of efficient 
compromises toward the boundaries of X. However, it seems 
less relevant whether the parties select an efficient compromise 
when they engage in the process of identifying differences 
and searching for similarities. Discussion on opposition and 
attempts to modify it allow for such a behavior. Obviously 
it involves changes of the utilities but this is the strength of 
the approach. Although it may be based on detailed analytical 
considerations, it allows broadening of one's perspective and 
calls for a creative use of resources. 
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Application of analysis and support based on opposition in 
the example given in Section II does not necessarily disal-
low the construction and use of utility functions. However, 
these functions are no longer required to approximate the 
efficient solutions. The union, instead of trying to guess the 
management's utility may assess the type of opposition for the 
compromise solutions it contemplates. 
We presented here an approach which has considerably 
weaker informational requirements than the approaches based 
on utility theory. Another important characteristic of our 
approach is that it is general and allows for consideration of 
different, dynamically changing and nonquantifiable attributes. 
Research on how these attributes can be incorporated and 
whether they should be introduced into opposition or treated 
separately is required. 
One research direction to consider is the separation of forces 
pulling apart from these pulling together. Neither individual 
utilities nor opposition as discussed here allows to make a 
distinction between different efficient solutions. It is obvious, 
however, that only some of these solutions may be acceptable 
as compromises. Within utility framework different methods 
are proposed leading to aggregation of individual utilities. 
Practical use of these methods is minimal as they require the 
parties' discussion about their relative power and strength of 
conviction. Within the approach we propose, opposition may 
be complemented with cooperation which define the strength 
of the willingness to negotiate. Cooperation may allow to 
distinguish between efficient solutions, for example, in Fig. 2, 
cooperation for Uo is weaker than for e• . It also may allow 
to distinguish between utility-equivalent solutions el , ···, e6. 
In that sense, the constructiveness of an offer mentioned by 
the union's negotiator (Section 11-C) is related to the type 
(strength) of cooperation associated with the offer. 
Another inviting research direction deals with generalization 
of the concept of opposition, or more generally, the "motiva-
tional force" of each party (defined by Y'U(x) when the utility 
U(x) exists) to problems for which no utility function can 
possibly be defined. The existence of a utility function hinges 
upon the requirements that preferences be transitive, complete, 
continuous, and independent of the path by which a position is 
reached (equifinality). These assumptions have been rejected 
by many analysts as being problematic, e.g., people too often 
display circular preferences, and the satisfaction accrued by 
an agent depends on the history of the negotiation. In such 
cases, there provably does not exist a utility function defined 
solely on the offer space. However a "motivational force," 
corresponding to the gradient Y'U(x) does exist: recall that the 
gradient measured the preferred direction of local movement at 
a point, and the strength of the desire to move in that direction, 
and these notions still do apply meaningfully to the agents 
at that position. Therefore a measure of this "force" can be 
defined meaningfully in terms of the local preferences at a 
position. There is a close analogy with the mathematics of the 
electromagnetic field encountered in physics: motivation is like 
a force, and utility is like the potential corresponding to the 
force. The electric field is always the gradient of a potential 
(E = -Y'V, and the gain in V in moving from one point 
to another is independent of the path) and one can do any 
analysis using the force field or the potential equivalently; this 
corresponds to the traditional utility assumptions. However, 
the magnetic field H is in general not a gradient of a 
potential (curl H -f. 0 which implies nontransitivity and path-
dependence); but formal analysis about a force is clearly 
meaningful even when a potential does not exist. This case 
corresponds to the way we have used the notion of opposition, 
focusing on the gradients more than on any utility function 
that a gradient may belong to. This analogy captures the 
spirit of our call for systematic methods for dealing with 
local preference information, without carrying the baggage of 
unrealistic rationality assumptions from utility theory. 
APPENDIX 
DETERMINING THE REGION OF 
POSSIBLY EFFICIENT COMPROMISES 
In Fig. I, the analyst has conservatively estimated the 
extreme values p E [0.3, 3] of management's tradeoffs (slopes 
of the level curves of the utility function UM(w,S)). Note 
that these extreme values do not depend on the point e3 or any 
other specific point, but are estimated as bounds on UM's slope 
for the entire region of interest. Using this information, and the 
fact that efficient points in the interior of X must be tangential 
points (Theorem I , part A) the set E of possibly effi cient 
compromises can be determined as follows. Computing the 
union ' s gradient from (!), we have 
1.951 
Y'Uu(w, s) = - (w _ 5.596)2ew + 0.5e,. 
Consider first ~c extreme value o.!_ management's gradient 
p = 0.3. Since Y'Uu(w,S) = -k'Y'Uu(w,S) for efficient 
points, we can find one extreme CC (which is thus a boundary 
of E) by solving 
1.951 
(w - 5.596)2ew + 0.5e, = -k(0.3e.v + e, ) 
which has as its solution w = 1.98. Likewise, solving the 
same equation with p = 3 results in w = 4.45 as the other 
extreme CC. The region between w = 1.98 and w = 4.45 is 
thus the desired set E. 
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